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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
STYLE CRETE, INC., a Utah corporation,

Case No.
10902

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF CASE
Complaints in condemnation were filed by the State
Road Commission in late 1965 and early 1966 to acquire the
property of Style Crete, Inc. (hereafter referred to as
"Style-Crete") for the relocwtion of the main line track of
the Western Pacific Railroad and for the construction of a
new highway known as 2300 West Street in Salt Lake City.
Both acquisitions were incident to the devielopment of the
Interstate Highway System in westerly Salt Lake City.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The law issues as to the right of condemnation, public
use and necessity, and other jurisdictional prerequisites
were admitted in the Commission's favor. 'Dhe cases were
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thereafter consolidated for joint trial on the questions of
just compensation (R. 13, 121-122). A special jury venire
was impaneled and the hearing on value and damages commenced on March 13, 1967. After 8 days of trial, the jury
returned into open court special interrogatories which found
the difference between the value of the total property before
condemnation and the value of the remaining property after
condemnation in the sum of $122,500.00. Judgment on the
interrogatories was thereafter entered by the trial Court
(R. 91-94).
The Commission's Motion for a New Trial was denied
on April 27, 1967 (R. 95, 99-100).
MAP OF SUBJECT PROPERTY AND TAKING
Attached as Appendix 1 herein is a reproduction of
trial Exhibit D-1 illustrative of the Style-Crete property
on the base sheet, the expansion plans of Style-Crete on
overlay # 1, and the course and alignment of the two condemnaJtion takings on overlay #2. The Western Pacific
acquisition is shown as it cuts through the property in an
east-west direction directly in front of the industrial plant,
and the 2300 West acquisition as it courses the property
east of the plant, south to north.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While some parts of Appellant's Statement of Facts
recount accurately the events of trial, in the main it does
not. Appellant's Statement (pp. 2-12 of its Brief) is substantially misleading, inaccurate in context and violative
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of several long-established principles - it offends the rule
that the facts shall be presented in a light which most favorably support the findings and verdict of the jury, it fails
to set out the substantial evidence of both parties and the
admissions made by the State's value witness, and the Statement is argumentative rather than factual in nature. Indeed, the Statement on pages 8, 10-12 of the State's Brief
partakes of jury argument on the weight of the testimony.
As a result, Respondent will herein make its own statement
of the facts of trial, bearing in mind the admonition of Rule
75(p), U. R. C. P.
1.

Property Before Condemnation.

The property \Vas situated in the general industrial
area between 2200-2400 West on the north side of 5th South
Street in Salt Lake City (Ex. D-1). Of irregular shape, flat
in slope and of fair drainage, the property was comprised
of 14.26 acres. Access and frontage of better than 63 feet
were afforded directly from 5th South Street (R. 180, 647).
The property was used for the manufacture of pre-cast
stone products, all phases of fabrication being carried out
in a specially designed building locaited at the west front
section of the premises (R. 252, Ex. D-1). Comprising
17 ,000 square feet and constructed of steel beams and joists,
reinforced, double load-bearing walls, cement flooring and
stone walls, the building was built in several phases from
1958 through 1962 as business conditions warranted, at a
cost of $110,000.00 (R. 246-254, 359-360, 365-369). Upon
the advice of McCown E. Hunt, a structural and design engineer, the building was built so that raw materials would
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pass from front to rear (or south to north) in the manufacturing process. The economic and functional utility of
the building, itself, was dependent upon continuity of the
south to north process (R. 396-401, 439, 441, 496, 497).
There being no sewer in the area, sanitation was provided by a Board of Health approved septic tank and drain
field within the Style-Crete property, located southeast of
the manufacturing plant and beneath the customer parking
area (R. 506-512).
The critical phase of the manufacturing process occurred at the south end of the building in the "casting section".
After the aggregate was mixed, transported by crane, and
poured into specially constructed molds of required size,
the cast stone underwent controlled vibration to insure uniformity and removal of air bubbles (R. 384-395, 414-447).
After the stone began to set up and cm·e during the "green
period," it was imperative that the molds be not thereafter
subject to uncontrolled or foreign ground movement and
vibration{R. 444-447). The Engineer Hunt, Architect Budd
and the owner all testified to the exacting specifications for
cast stone (R. 384-395, 444-447, 475-479). The average
thickness of cast stone slabs is 214 inches (R. 388). The
required tolerances are 1/16 inch or less for panels 5 feet
wide and 13 feet long (R. 475-476). Vibration during the
"green period" could result in warping or cracking. The
cast stone manufactured by Style-Crete was as large as 56
feet long, 4 feet wide 1 foot thick and weighed 20 tons (R.
255). Hunt and Budd further testified that in addition to
the close manufacturing tolerances of cast stone, uncon-

5

trolled vibrations during the early curing stage or "green
period" would impair its structural strength (R. 444-447,
481).
The front of the property had site prominence and full
view from 5th South Street, while the conglomerate and
congested section of the plant in the rear was removed
from public and customer observation (R. 595-598). At
the date of condemnation, Style-Crete had planned and secured a building permit to construct the final phase of the
industrial plant, enlargement of the engineering offices and
expansion of the entrance and parking facilities (R. 3713711, D-1 Overlay #1).
The property had functioned as a fully operable cast
stone manufacturing plant for several years and the testimony was unequivocal from every witness qualified fo
speak on the subject, both for Style-Crete and the State,
that the highest and best use of the subject property was
the use actually made, i.e., a cast stone industrial site (R.
570-573, 710).
The market value of the land and building was evaluated by the witnesses for both parties under accepted standards, cost replacement less depreciation of the building, and
market comparison on the land (R. 549, 582-594, 710-726).
Fo1· the landowner, B. Lue Bettilyon of Bettilyon Construction Company testified that the cost to construct the manufacturing building new in 1966 was $123,322.00. Applying
to that sum a factor for estimated depreciation, the lanjowner's appraisal expert, Ray A. Williams, testified that
the depreciated value of the building was $111,787.00 (R.

6
590). Based on comparable sales, Williams determined the
market value of the land to be $5,000.00 per acre or $71,325.00 fo1· the 14.26 acres. His total appraisal was $183,000.00 (R. 590-594, Ex. D-25). C. Francis Solomon, appraiser called by the State, opined that the depreciated
value of the building before the taking plus the value of
the land, itself was $184,600.00 (R. 726). The expert testimony of borth parties produced little conflict as to the fair
market value of the total property before condemnation.
In fact, the appraisal of the State's witness was nearly
$1500.00 higher than that of Style-Crete's witness, Williams.

2.

Nature of Condemnation Taking by State.
The two acquisitions of the State were:
Railroad taking. The Western Pacific right of way cut
across the front portion of the Style-Crete property
east-west, 100 feet in width and on a dirt and rock fill
of 8 to 9 feet in heighth (R. 189-195, Ex. D-1). Fully
fenced on both sides and in front of the Style-Crete
building as well, it did not permit access crossing except at 2300 West Street (R. 199-201). Normal water
drainage conduits along the right of way were not provided (R. 211). The north edge of the right of way
came within 9 to 10 feet of the Southwest corner of the
manufacturing building (R. 189), the center of the
tracks being 80 feet from the casting tables in the
plant (R. 304-305). The W. P. trainmaster testified
that the track would be used by 12 trains daily, 5 heavy
freights in each direction and one passenger train each
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way (R. 225). The trains would reach speeds of 60 to
80 miles per hour in the Style-Crete area (R. 228-229),
and the freights would average 80 to 100 cars with a
gross weight of 5,000 tons (R. 226-227).
Highway Taking. The 2:300 West acquisition was 80
feet in width and coursed through the property south
to north (R. 181, 204). On a continuous dirt fill 3 to
9 feet, its sloped embankments prohibited direct access from the remaining Style-Crete property, save at
a point north of the plant (R. 729). No provisions
were made by the Highway Department for drainage
or water collection ditches on either side of the highway (R. 207).
The total acreage taken from the owner was 1.999, .41
acre for the railroad and 1.58 acres for the highway.
3.

Testimony on Remaining Property After Condemnation.

It was with respect to the effect of the two partialtakings upon the highest and best use and the value of the
remaining property of Style-Crete that the expert testimony
was at odds. Style-Crete called six witnesses on the subject
and the Highway Department called 3 witnesses. Regarding best use and value after condemnation, the witnesses
of Style-Crete variously took stock of the following factors:

(a) The building was placed in a depressed corner,
locked in by a nine foot high railroad right of way 11
feet distant on the south and by a nine foot high roadway immediately on the east (R. 194, 378, 670, D-1).
The two acquisitions had produced a pincer or scis-
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sors effect on the plant and its remaining use, blocking all front entrances and access from 5th South
Street, removing all employee and customer parking,
preventing any feasible use of the south and east sides
of the building, and restricting use of the storage yar Js
on the east (R. 402--104, 496, 497, 509-602). Hunt testified that all reasonable access to the office, engineering room and the display areas for customers had been
eliminated by the takings, and that the critical aggregate storage area was cut off by the 2300 West fill. The
architect, Budd, said that customers cannot get to the
plant without going through the rear end (R. 448-451,
496-497).
(b) Vibration. It was the opm10n of two engineering experts and an architect that the probabilities were
such that the ground vibration caused by the freight
trains on the W. P. track in front of the remaining
building would unreasonably jeopadize the structural
soundness and tolerance requirements of the cast stone
process in the building. The leading witness, Mr. Leeds,
gave empirical as well as opinion evidence of vibration
damage. One of a half dozen qualified engineering
seismologists in the U. S. (R. 300), Leeds had not only
measured, but had evaluaJted the nature, strength,
source and effect of all types of grounJ movement,
trains, freeways, earthquakes, missile firings, ertc.,
throughout the world (R. 283-292). He had monitored
and evaluated the effect of passing railroad trains
upon concrete structures at various industrial facili-

ties in the country (R. 293-300). Leeds made actual
recordings of ground vibration on the old W. P. and
the existent U. P. lines 80 feet distant from center
track. By soil analysis, ground geology at the monitoring points were determined to be uniform with soil
conditions of Style-Crete. Applying the vibration factor actually measured to the remaining property of
Style-Crete, Leeds opined that the ground movement
would "possibly cause damage to the curing concrete
in the initial stages to a degree that incipient hidden
damage might be sustained" (R. 301-320). Furthermore, Mr. Leeds was of the judgment that the building
could not be used for any industrial use requiring precision work (R. 322-331).
McCown E. Hunt, having written substantial specifications for cast stone and having designed several
cast stone plants lR. 435, 436-444), was of the judgment that the railroad vibration would substantially
affect the stability of a cast stone product were an
attempt made to manufacture after condemnation (R.
445-447).
Mr. Budd testified of the need for exac.tness in
cast stone fabrication and the critical points of setting
up and curing of the initial concrete molds (R. 474476). He, too, had prepared substantial specificaitions
for cast stone products on large commercial buildings.
Whereas the Style-Crete plant had been a competent
manufacturing facility prior to condemnation, Budd
was of the judgment that by reason of the vibration
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and scissor influence of the two takings, the remaining
building was no longer functional as such. As an architect, he would not accept the products of such a
plant (R. 476-485).
(c) Water Ponding. After construction of the railroad and highway, substantial ponding of water occurred in the pocket created along the railroad and
highway immediately south and east of the building
(R. 508-510, 527). Lack of drainage facilities in the
condemned area kept the water impounded and made
it impractical to move equipment in the area or to store
materials (R. 428-430, 451-453). Style-Crete had experienced no such ponding problems before condemnation (R. 432).
( d) Sanitation. The compacted railroad dike had
knocked out the septic tank system and drainage field
of Style-Crete (R. 451-453). The assistant sanitary
engineer for Salt Lake City, A. R. Cardwell, stated
that in his judgment, a feasible and adequate septic
tank system for industrial use, could not be relocated
at other points on the Style-Crete property after condemnation due to soil conditions and water table (R.
506-512, Ex. D-22). The State, on page 12 of its Statement of Facts, argues that the testimony of Mr. Cardwell on the loss of the building's sanita.tion facility,
was of "doubtful weight.1''
iSignificantly, the State offered no testimony, whatsoever, at trial to
meet the evidence of sanitation damage, and the testimony of Cardwell
stood before the jury and stands before this Court uncontroverted.
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( e) The combination of the two takings created a
physical severance of the remainder into three independent tracts (Ex. D-1, R. 182-183). The integrity
of the property was ruptured by the condemnation and
little relationship remained OOtween the divorced
pieces. Particularly was this so with respect to the
small triangle of .53 acre left south of the railroad
which now only had value for speculation (R. 668).
(f) Best Use and Value. Because of one or more of
the foregoing, it was the opinion of all expert witnesses, including Solomon for the State, that the building and remaining land no longer had as its highest
use, that of a cast stone manufacturing plant. Hunt
said that the building should be abandoned as a fabrication site because of the hazards of vibration and the
proximate position of the plant up against the two takings (R. 448-451). Leeds concluded that vibration risks
rendered the building of use only for dead storage (R.
322). The appraisers, Williams and Solomon, were in
agreement that the vibration hazards were of sufficient
consequence to the buyer and seller in the market so
as to conclude that the property was no longer suited
for cast stone or any other precision manufacturing
use (R. 603, 729), but they differed in their judgments
as to what reasonable use could be made of the building. On the one hand, Williams thought the building to
be suited only for industrial storage (R. 668-675).
Solomon, on the other hand, was of the opinion that
the building could be used for light industrial and nontechnical manufacturing (R. 827-828).
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Having admitted that the vibration and close proximity of the railroad and 2300 West could destroy the
functional utility of the building, Mr. Solomon was
nevertheless of the judgment that the remaining building had a market value of $68,750.00 (R. 832). He
acknowledged that if that building were to be constructed new and free from all the damaging effects of
the railroad and 2300 West, its cost new would be only
$77,380.00 (R. 834). He did not testify as to any comparable properties, sale or rental, in support of his
$68,750.00 opinion. Mr. Williams determined the fair
market value of the remaining building was $28,036.36
(R. 629), and as a basis, elicited several transactions
involving comparable warehouse properties, sale and
rental (R. 623-629).
(g) Abandonment. By reason of the condemnation
suit, Style-Crete elected to abandon the building
for further manufacturing and was in the process of
so doing at the time of trial (R. 450-451). The owner
testified that the proximity and effect of the railroad
and highway made it economically impractical and unfeasible to reorganize or relocate sections of the plant
within the building (R. 430-431).

4.

Other Available Land Proffer of State.

At no other time in the trial did Style-Crete introduce
or offer any testimony running to the claim that by reason
of the amount and type of acreage under ownership, the
total property, before condemnation, constituted an eco-
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nomic unit dependent on its size for full value. Nor was it
any part of Style-Crete's case thait any such economic unit
had been destroyed or damaged by reason of the physical
loss of the 1.99 acres actually taken and shrinkage of the
unit.
Nonetheless, the highway department during its case
in chief, offered to show that as of December, 1965, there
was available for sale by Arnold Machinery Company, ten
acres of prnperty on the immediate west of Style-Crete (R.
93,1). The proffer of State counsel, made out of hearing of
the jury, i·epresented that the Arnold property was landlocked without access, and that it was bounded "on the
north by the old Western Pacific right-of-way" (R. 934).
Appellant has, however, inserted as Appendix - Figure 3
in its Brief, a plat which would have the Arnold land abutting a city street on the north. 2 (See Sfate's Brief p. 43.)
The Court had previously denied several attempts of the
State to raise the question during cross-examination of the
witnesses for Style-Crete.
The State's proff er was denied by the Court on the
ground that the availability of other land was not legally
relevant under the facts of this case (R. 937). The
State did not offer the sale of the Arnold land as a comparable sales transaction, although invited to do so by the
trial Judge (R. 937). And Mr. Solomon, the State's only
value witness, did not rely on the availability of neighbor2Appendix .3 of Appellant's Brief is imaginary and styled to suit the
State',, intentions herein. Nothing resembling this drawing was tenderi:,d by the State to the trial Court. The Respondent moves that it
be stricken and disregarded.
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ing lands as a basis for his conclusions on either land value
or severance damages.
5.

Charge to the Jury and Verdict.

The trial Court inducted in its charge to the jury,
either verbatim or in substance, 14 of Jthe 15 requests for
for instructions submitted by the State (R. 63-80). By
answers to special interrogatories the jury found that the
af te,1· value of the Style-Crete properties was $122,500.00
less than the value before the taking (R. 14). Judgment of
just compensation was entered thereon on March 28, 1967
(H.. 91-94). The motion for new trial filed by the State
was denied April 27, 1967 (R. 95-96, 99-100).
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO HEAR EVIDENCE OFFERED BY
THE STATE AS TO THE AVAILABILITY OF
ADJACENT PROPERTY FOR PURCHASE BY
THE DEFENDANT STYLE-CRETE.
No issue is raised on this appeal that the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict. The State attemp.ts to
overthrow the verdict and judgment by particular errors of
the trial Court, which are without substance. The nub of
the State's appeal is stated in Points I through III of its
Brief, that the trial Court erred in refusing the State's
proffer which purportedly would show that Style-Crete
could have "purchased as replacement land" ten acres of
landlocked property from its next door neighbor on the
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west. No issue of "availability of replacement land" was
raised by the pleadings or incorpomted within the pre-trial
order (R. 121-123). Nevertheless, the State argues it here
as a "triable issue" of severance damage. The answer to
the State's claim lies in an understanding of the facts
(which Respondent has set out in this Brief at some length)
and of the nature of severance damages under considera·
tion. Once digested, the facts dictate the application of the
law and the conclusion that the State's proffer has no rele.
vancy whatsoever to the issues of severance damage in this
case.

1. Severance Damage Valuation in Eminent Domain is Governed By The "Before and After" Rule.
Art. I Sec. 22 of the State Constitution is declarative
of the basic right to just compensation in eminent domain.
The implementing statute, 78-34-10 U. C. A. 1953, provides
for the measurement and payment of severance damage in
the partial-condemnation of property:
"Compensation and damages - How assessed.
- The court, jury * * * must hear such legal
evidence * * *, and thereupon must acertain
and assess:

"* * *
"(2) If the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the dam·
ages which will accrue to the portion not sought to
be condemned by reason of its severance from the
portion sought to be condemned and the construction
of the improvement in the manner proposed by the
plaintiff. * * *" (Italics added.)
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In ascertaining what severance damage has been sustained, this Court has long held fast to the rule that the
measuring rod of that damage is the difference in the value
of the prope1iy before and after condemnation. Stockdale
v. Rio Grande W.R. Co. and Anheuser Busch Brewing Assor., 28 Utah 201, 77 Pac. 849 ( 1904); Telluride Power Co.
v. Bruneau, 41 Utah 4, 125 Pac. 399 (1912); Weber Basin
Conservancy Dist. v. Nelson, 11 U. 2d 253, 358 P. 2d 81
(1960). In State Road Comm. v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189
P. 2d 113 (19·18), Justice Pratt, for a unanimous Court,
wrote of the definition:
"The difference in the market value of the
farm before and after condemnation does truly reflect that loss [severance damage] as presumably
the difference will be founded upon the various
changes incident to the proximity of the highway."
The Comt has recently gi vc11 further attention to the
methodology of severance damage in the leading decisions
of State Road C01nm. v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d
76 (1961) and State Road Comm. v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305,
383 P. 2d 917 (1963). In Peterson, it was said:
"As to the error assigned in instructing on damages : notwithstanding the zealous efforts of counsel to torture them, we think they were such that
the jury understood and applied the correct measure
of damages : for the land actually taken : the fair
cash market value on the date of condemnation; and
for severance damages to the remainder: the difference between its fair cash market value before
and after the taking." (Emphasis added.)
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And in State Road Comm. v. Hansen, supra, the rule
remained constant:
·'The issue of severance damages was also cor1·ectly fried and submitted to the jury under a
proper instruction that the owner was not limited
to the value of the land taken, but was entitled to
'severance damages', that is, the difference in value
of the remaining tract before and after the taking."
Thus, in a cadre of decisions, this Court has firmly implanted as the rule of damages in severance valuation, the
difference between the fair market value of the property
before condemnation and its fair market value after condemnation and the construction of the public work. Nor is
there anything singular about the holdings of the Utah
Court on the point. The "before and after rule" of severance damage valuation has been adopted overwhelmingly
by the high court of practically every state of the Union.
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 528 Sec. 14.23, 5th ed.; 3 27
Am. Jur. 2d 60 Ern. Dom. 271.
In determining the diminution in the value of the remaining property caused by the partial-acquisition, all fac0 In applying the "before and after principle" the treatise writers suggest that the more logical and practical method is to determine the
total just compensation to be paid by the difference between the value
of the entire property before c:mdemnation and the value of the remaining property after condemnation, rather than to determine
merely severance damage to the remainder by its value before and
after. 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain 547, Sec. 14.23 5th ed.; 1 Orgel
on Valuation under Eminent Domain 251, Sec. 52 2d ed.
This criticism appears justified since it is a non-sequitur of sorts
to evaluate the remaining property before condemnation, when in fact,
there was no remaining property in existence before condemnation.
The Utah cases are pemiissive of the suggested approach, and both
parties herein proceeded on that basis in their testimony.
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tors which reasonably tend to depreciate the remainder in
the eyes of the buyer and seller in the open market may be
taken into account. Telluride Water Power v. Bruneau, 41
Utah 4, 125 Pac. 399 (1912); 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain 555, Sec. 14.24 5th ed. and cases therein cited.
2. Exception to General Rule in the event that Severance
Damage can be corrected by Replacement of Like Property.

The preeminent rule of the "before and after" of severance damage has its exception. If the severance damage
which is sustained by the remaining property can be corrected through the substitution of similar property to take
the place of the property condemned, the measure of damages may be the cost of acquiring the substitution or replacement property rather than the "before and after" formula.
This qualification of the general rule is interwoven
within the precept of just compensation as defined in State
Road Comm. v. N able,• "that the owners must be put in as
good a position money wise as they would have occupied
had their property not been taken." If the severance damage to the remaining land can be cured by the purchase of
similar and available land and if the purchase price for
such land is less than the severance damage otherwise determined under the general rule of the "before and after",
then the cost of such replacement would be an adequate
measure of damage, for the landowner is thus put in "as
good a position money wise" as he would have occupied
prior to condemnation.
46 U. 2d 40, 305 P. 2d 495 (1957).
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Even as an exception to the "before and after rule",
the replacement theory of severance damage lacks general
acceptance. 5 This Court has nonetheless recognized the application of the doctrine under restricted facts in two cases,
Proi•o River Water Users Assn. v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93,
133 P. 2d 777 (1943) and State Road Comm. v. Co-op Security Corp. of the L. D. S. Church, 122 Utah 134, 247 P.
2d 269 (1952). And in two other decisions, State Road
Comm. v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P. 2d 113 (1948) and
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d
693 ( 1960), the Court refused to apply the replacement
theory because of its irrelevancy to the facts. It is clear
from those decisions that the "replacement rule" is atypical and applied only in the event that the appraisal of severance damages is premised on the claim that the economic
unit of the total property has been damaged by reason of
the physical removal and loss of the actual property condemned. If the land shrinkage of the economic unit can be
cured by the substitution or replacement of property of
equal production and utility and if such property is available for sale on the open market, the cost to cure or replace
the condemned property is the measure of severance damage. That is the full import of the "replacement rule" and
no more.
sAs the Appellant's Brief will admit, only two other jurisdictions,
Missouri and Illinois, have recognized the doctrine. The last time the
lliinois Supreme Court touched on the issue was in 1886, Illinois and
St. L. Co. v. Switzer, 117 ill. 399, 7 N. E. 664. The Missouri Court
has mentioned it only twice, once in 1847 and again in 1917. Hannibal
v. 8chaubacher, 17 Mo. 582 (1847) and City of St. Loui,s V. St. Loui,s
S. R. Co., 272 Mo. 80 (1917). The leading treatise, Nichols on Eminent Domain, does not make any mention of the rule.
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Thus in the case of first impression, Provo River
Water Use1'S Assn. v. Carlson, supra, it was claimed that
the total dairy farm, although not contiguous, was one economic land unit, and that by reason of the condemnation
fo1· a rese1·voir of 18.'75 acres of wild pasture, the remaining farm one and one-half miles away was all damaged
uniformly because of the loss to the "dairy farm as a coordinated unit". For the Court, McDonough, J. noted there
was no claim made that the remainder had been physically
severed or cut, or left physically inoperable, or damaged
due to proximity, location and/or use of the reservoir project:
"In this case there u·as no contention that the
erection of the reservoii· and the relocation of the
railroad tracks could in any manner injure any of the
properties of defendant situated in the town of
Charleston. There was no proof offered to show
that either the taking of the 18.75 acres for reservoir purposes, or the construction of the reservoir,
could possibly result in any physical impairment of
the properties fremaining property] in Charleston"
P. 99 of 103 Utah.

It was under these facts that this Court declared that
if the 18.75 ac1·es could be replaced by the purchase of other
lands, the economic balance and size of the Carlson property would be restored and the owners damage would be

thereupon cured :
"If he could purchase other pasture land or
farm land convertible into pasture, within a distance
from his barns comparable to that of the condemned
tract, and such other land would provide relatively
the same kind of forage for the same number of
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cows or forage of equal ration-value throughout the
seven months he used the wild pasture tract, it could
not be contended that his properties in Charleston
could be impaired or depreciD.:te<l by taking the pasture. If another tract of equal forage-producing
value and conveniences could be substituted for the
tract condemned, whether larger or smaller in area,
the defendant would be in relatively the same position he was in before the construction of the reservoir." P. 102 of 103 Utah.
In the subsequent case of State Road Comm. v. Co-op
Security Corporation of L. D. S. Church, supra, the issue
of severance damage was similar to that in Carlson. Before
condemna;tion, the total property of the condemnee was
comprised of two separate parcels used as a "dairy unit"
of 100 cow capacity. It was contended by the owner that
due to the removal and loss of the 7.89 acres condemned
from one parcel, the available property on which feed could
be raised was reduced "by about ten head with the result
that the entire project was damaged at least 20%.'' As in
Carlson, severance damage was predicated upon the loss to
the economic unit by shrinkage of the total property size
and not from factors normally associated with severance
injury, vis., proximity and location of the public project,
restriction of access, air, light and view and rendering the
remainder physically unusable. The Court stated that under such facts, the availability of other land to replace that
condemned was an issue properly to be raised:
"If similar land to that taken was available on
the date the summons was served, which could have
been substituted for that condemned, it cannot be
contended that the entire project was depreciated
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in value because it was made economically unfeasible
because of lack of pasture land to graze a minimum
number of dairy cattle. Under such a state of the
record the opinion of .experits as to the amounts the
project was damaged was wholly immaterial and
irrelevant. * * *
"Since the evidence shows that this property
could have been replaced there was no basis for the
award of severance damage except 'as to the two
small tracts. * * *" P. 140 of 122 Utah.
Wolfe, C. J. in concurrence, pointed out the limit of the replacement rule and the reason it was invoked in the case:
1

"I concur. I desire to add, however, that when
severance damages are sought, as in this case, because the taking of a part of a farm has upset the
economic balance of the farm and thus has damaged
that part of the farm n()t condemned, there must be
proof that there are not available comparable lands
which could be purchased by the condemnee which
would restore the economic balance of the farm."
Between the Carlson and Co-op Security decisions,
State Road Comm. v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P. 2d 113
(1948) was decided. There the owners offered to show
that in a partial-taking of their property, severance damage to a building should be based on the cost of replacement
or restoring the improvement. This Court rejected the
proffer in favor of the predominate rule that severance
damages are determined by the difference in market value
of the property before and after condemnation:
"The restoration costs measure of damages is
appropriate when such restoration costs accurately
measure the decrease in the market value of the
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property damaged but not taken. * * * An effort to measure the effect of its removal simply by
the cost of removal and its loss as a foundation as
originally located does not truly reflect the depreciatory effect on the farm. The difference in market
value of the farm before and after condemnation
does truly refleot that loss, as presumably the cliff erence will be founded upon the various changes
incident to the proximity of the highway" P. 117
of 189 P. 2d.
The most recent case before this Court which raises the
"replacement rule" is Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10
U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 ( 1960). The landowner's case on
severance damage therein was hinged upon the depreciation
in the value of the remaining property due to inadequate
access, impossibility of use, and physical condition of the
remainder, all of which was caused by the design, location
and construction of the railroad project. No claim was
made for damage from the loss of the condemned acreage
or from the shrinkage of any economic land unit. The railroad contended that the trial court prejudicially erred in
"submitting the question of severance damages to the jury
because no competent evidence was produced that other
similar lands were unavailable". This Court affirmed the
trial court and held that the question of the availability of
land to replace the condemned property was quite immaterial:
"Under the above facts, evidence of the unavailability of other lands would be immaterial, because
the damages to the remaining lands cannot be mitigated by obtaining other lands in other places which
could serve in this unified operation the same pur-
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pose as the lands from which the sand and gravel
was taken for the use to which the lands were suitable" P. 312 of 10 U. 2d.
Thus, this Court has left little to doubt in these four
decisions that evidence as to the availability of replacement
property may be shown in severance damage cases only if:
( 1) The claim of severance damage stems from the
removal and loss of property actually condemned causing a land shrinkage in a formerly balanced economic
land unit;
(2) That the substituted property will be of the same
functional use and will cure the severance damage.
3. The Replacement Rule was Totally Inapplicable in the
Style-Crete Case.
The undisputed damage factors make it impossible to
bring this case anywhere ·within the reach of the "replacement land" rule of Carlson and Co-op Security. The StyleCrete industry was in no sense compamble to a dairy farm.
Style-Crete made no claim that the total land area was an
economic unit dependent upon productive acreage. And
Style-Crete did not claim damage due to shrinkage or reduction in size of land parcel. The attempt of counsel for
the State to inject into the case a proffer of "available replacement land" was improper for several reasons. Firstly,
the "available land" was subject to the same defects and
disadvantages created by the State through condemnation
and construction of the railroad, as did plague the StyleCrete property. It was a landlocked parcel with no access.
Secondly, the claims of severance damage of StyleCrete stem from the probable vibration of the railroad, the

Thus, this Court has left little to
doubt in these five decisions that evidence
as to the availability of replacement property
may be shown in severance damages cases only
if:
(1) The claim of severance damage
stems from the removal and loss of
property actually condemned causing
a land shrinkage in a formerly balanced
economic land unit; and
(2) That the substituted property
will be of the same functional use,
will cure the severance damage, and
will restore the landowner to the
same relative condition he had prior
to the taking.
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LThe Respondent's Brief now continues
at line 13 on page 247
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERTS. CAMPBELL, JR.,
520 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City,Utah,
PAUL E. REIMANN,
500 Kennecott Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Responde~
Style Crete, Inc.
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Court referred to and distinguished as unauthori tative the two cases, Co-op Security
and Carlsen upon which the Stnte urges herein
as controlling:
"Both of these cases are distinguishable upon their facts.
In each
of them evidence was adduced that
suitable land could be substituted
which would restore the landowner to
the same relative position he had
prior to the taking.
In the instant
case we do not have a situation wherein
the land taken from the condemnee (Binghams) could be readily replaced with
similar land to restore him to the same
relative condition." Opn. of Callister, J.
The argument, upon which the State primarily relies herein on pages 23 and 39 of
its Brief, that the landowner has a burden
to "mitigate and minimize his severance
damage", was also raised by the State and
rejected in the Bingham decision:
"The State, however, urges that the
landowner has an additional burden.
Not only must he prove that there is
severance damage, but also that he has
attempted to minimize such damage.
With this latter proposition we disagree."
The Bingham case is of controlling precedent herein for it is clear here (as it
was in Howes) from all the evidence including
the excluded proffer of the State, that the
purchase of the Arnold Machinery land on
the west was not similar in situation and
could not "restore" Style Crete "to the same
relative position it had prior to the taking".
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The Brief of Style Crete on page 24,
after line 3 ending with the words L_able"
P. 312 of 10 U.2d/ should be amended to
permit the following paragraph in lieu and
in place of lines 4 through 12 of said page
24.
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The very recent decision of this Court
in State Road Commission v. Bingham, et al,
No. 10831 decided on January 23, 1968, is
significant in the determination of this
Appeal. There like here, the Road Commission
argued that as a condition to the recovery
of severance damages, the owner must prove
that he could not replace by purchase or
otherwise in the open market, the property
interest which had been damaged.
In the
Bingham case, it was the taking of an access
right which gave rise to the severance damage
claimed, whereas in the instant case, it was
the limitation of access together with other
factors, viz., proximity and pincer of the
railroad and highway, probable railroad vibration, loss of sanitation and air, light
and view, which underlay the severance damage
claim. In both cases, the applicable ruling
law is the same, since the severance damage
stems from the "taking for and construction of
the public project in the manner proposed."
78-34-10(2) u.c.A. 1953.
In Bingham, this Court rejected the
State's appeal and effectually held that the
purchase of other access to replace or substitute the access condemned was not relevant, since it would not place the owner's
land in the same relative position it had
prior to the taking.
In so holding, the
24 (i)

